Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system.  CEPS Special Report No. 136/April 2016 by Micossi, Stefano. et al.
 ISBN 978-94-6138-517-8 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise – without the prior permission of CEPS. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) 
© Centre for European Policy Studies 2016 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to 
promote a stronger EU financial system 
Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone and Miriam Cassella 
No. 136 / April 2016 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the application of the new European rules for burden-sharing and bail-
in in the banking sector, in view of their ability to accommodate broader policy goals of 
aggregate financial stability. It finds that the Treaty principles and the new discipline of state 
aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework for combating moral hazard 
and removing incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking by bankers. However, the 
application of the new rules may have become excessively attentive to the case-by-case 
evaluation of individual institutions, while perhaps losing sight of the aggregate policy 
needs of the banking system. Indeed, in this first phase of the banking union, while large 
segments of the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring and 
recapitalisation, the market may not be able to provide all the needed resources in the 
current environment of depressed profitability and low growth. Thus, a systemic market 
failure may be making the problem impossible to fix without resorting to temporary public 
support. But the risk of large write-offs of capital instruments due to burden-sharing and 
bail-in may represent an insurmountable obstacle to such public support as it may set in 
motion an investors’ flight. The paper concludes by showing that existing rules do contain 
the flexibility required to accommodate aggregate policy requirements in the general 
interest, and outlines a public support scheme for the precautionary recapitalisation of 
solvent banks that would be compliant with EU law. 
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1. The rationale of the EU rules on bail-in  
Since 2012, the EU regulatory framework for the banking sector has been deeply revised at 
record speed. Within the new system, the rules on burden-sharing and bail-in, aimed to 
ensure that losses of failing banks will primarily be borne by the shareholders and creditors 
of the banks, have come to play a central role.  
The financial crisis of 2008-09 and the ensuing sovereign debt and banking crises within the 
eurozone led national governments to underpin the balance sheets of several banks through 
extensive bail-outs at the expense of taxpayers. As shown in Figure 1, in 11 member states 
the fiscal impact of the bail-out measures undertaken between 2008 and 2014 exceeded 3% of 
the 2014 GDP; in Ireland, it reached 31.1%; and in Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia, more than 
18%.1  
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Data sources:  ECB, Economic Bulletin, No. 6/2015, and Eurostat for 2014 GDP. 
                                                   
* Stefano Micossi is Director General of Assonime, Chairman of the LUISS School of European Political 
Economy (SEP – LUISS) and a member of the CEPS Board of Directors. Ginevra Bruzzone is Deputy 
Director General of Assonime, where she heads the competition and regulation division, and visiting 
professor at the SEP – LUISS. Miriam Cassella is senior legal officer in Assonime’s competition and 
regulation division. 
The authors are grateful to Daniel Gros and Karel Lannoo for extensive comments and suggestions, 
and to Fabrizia Peirce and Alexandra D’Onofrio for outstanding research assistance and helpful 
discussions in writing the paper. The authors remain solely responsible, however, for the paper’s 
content.  
1 See also Ignazio Visco, Address to the Giornata Mondiale del Risparmio, Rome, 28 October 2015. 
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Public outrage for these enormous losses placed on taxpayers convinced policy-makers and 
legislators across the Atlantic – under the auspices of the G-20 and the Financial Stability 
Board – that the traditional system of underpinning fractional reserve banking with an 
implicit public guarantee had to be discontinued, and that bank shareholders and creditors 
should be called in to take losses and suffer the full consequences of reckless management 
through bail-in, before any public back-stop could come into play.  
When in 2012 the European Council acknowledged the need to break the vicious circle 
between sovereign and bank debt in the eurozone, the overhaul of the regulatory framework 
was sped up. By mid-2014, the Single Rulebook for all member states and the Banking Union 
legislation, establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) for the eurozone, were adopted. 
The new regulatory system involves higher capital requirements as well as new rules on 
bank resolution establishing the credible promise that shareholders and creditors would 
carry the full burden of bank losses, mainly through the new bail-in instrument, with three 
main goals. The first one is to eradicate moral hazard within the banking system by 
eliminating the implicit subsidy of the banking charter that had encouraged bankers to over-
borrow and take excessive risks. The second goal is to make it possible for even a large bank 
to fail without systemic repercussions on aggregate financial stability, minimising reliance on 
public support. The third goal is to make sure that different national approaches to bank 
rescues will not undermine the internal market by resulting in different costs of funding for 
banks with similar creditworthiness.  
During the transition to the new system, the European Commission used the control of state 
aid as an instrument to coordinate the response of the member states wishing to support 
distressed banks either by providing liquidity aid or helping them restructure and return to 
viability. In this connection, the legal basis to assess the compatibility of state aid with the 
Treaty was found in Article 107, paragraph 3, letter b, TFEU, which allows the Commission 
to declare state aid compatible with the Treaty if it is necessary to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a member state.  
Since 2008, the Commission has published seven communications in which it has explained 
the criteria it would follow in applying Article 107(3)(b) to state aid in the banking sector, 
adapting its approach to the different phases of the crisis. The most recent communication 
(the ‘Banking Communication’)2 was adopted in July 2013 to complement and update the 
notices on Recapitalisation and Treatment of Impaired Assets and supplement the 
Restructuring Communication. A distinguishing feature of the 2013 Banking Communication 
is that the Commission has committed to apply burden-sharing not only to shareholders but 
also to subordinated creditors.  
The new Banking Communication was issued in the belief that the worst of the crisis was 
over, in order to govern the transition to the full operation of the new EU system for the 
recovery and resolution of banks. In this context, state aid control was meant to partially 
anticipate the rules on the write-down and conversion of capital instruments that were going 
to be included in the new resolution framework. In 2014, the BRRD (Bank Recovery and 
                                                   
2 Communication from the Commission on the application from 1 August 2013 of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, 2013/C 216/01. 
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Resolution Directive) and the SRM Regulation,3 which are now in force, established the 
conditions under which the assets of shareholders and creditors of distressed banks are 
bailed-in, either on a stand-alone basis or as part of the resolution procedure.  
Expectations on the use of burden-sharing and of the bail-in tool by competition and 
resolution authorities directly affect the risk of capital instruments in the banking sector and, 
if not properly governed, may actually become a source of instability, rather than firming up 
the system. The critical distinction here – not always easy to establish in practice – is that 
between a crisis affecting one bank and a confidence or liquidity crisis where many banks get 
into trouble at the same time. The latter scenario is not a purely theoretical construct in the 
current phase of the banking union, with a banking system still suffering from diffuse 
situations of fragility as a legacy from the financial crisis and the continuing weakness of 
economic activity.4 In such circumstances, weak balance sheets may push banks’ shares to 
unreasonably low levels, raising the cost of fresh equity to prohibitive heights and, for that 
very reason, creating expectations of widespread banking crises possibly triggering bail-in. 
The ultra-low interest rates promoted by the ECB may aggravate the problem by depressing 
banks’ profitability even further.  
Thus, there is a non-negligible risk of investors fleeing the banking system in certain 
countries, potentially with eurozone-wide repercussions, generating a crisis that might 
eventually entail costs to taxpayers higher than under the previous bail-out regime. The 
expected stabilising effects of the new burden-sharing and bail-in system would thus be 
fool’s gold, as in Persaud (2014), rather than the real gold we are seeking in stronger banks 
within a more stable financial system.5 
It must be stressed that this problem may not be addressed through emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA), provided by national central banks within the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) to solvent financial institutions facing temporary liquidity problems, as it 
involves raising substantial amounts of fresh capital in support of bank restructuring 
programmes over an extended period of time. This task clearly goes beyond the remit of 
central bank liquidity support.    
The assumption that a private-market solution to higher capital requirements for solvent 
banks will always be available cannot be taken for granted – even if it would clearly be the 
preferred solution. Should the need arise for some form of public support in the systemic 
interest of financial stability, the way in which the new bail-in instrument will be used in 
different market settings and the ability to take full account of its systemic repercussions are 
of critical importance. The threat that public authorities will impose the write-down or 
                                                   
3 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014; Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014.  
4 IMF (2016), “Global Financial Stability Report”, Washington, D.C., April; see especially Chapter 1. 
5 See Avinash D. Persaud (2014), “Why Bail-In Securities Are Fool’s Gold”, Policy Brief 14-23, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. In the same vein, see Paul De Grauwe (2013), 
“The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the Eurozone”, CEPS 
Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 5 April; Charles Goodhart and Emilios Avgouleas (2014), “A critical 
evaluation of bail-in as a bank recapitalization mechanism”, in F. Allen, E. Carletti and J. Gray (eds), 
Bearing the losses from bank and sovereign default in the eurozone, Philadelphia, PA: FIC Press (Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center); and Stefano Micossi (2016), “Banking crises yet again and how to fix it”, 
CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 15 February.  
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conversion of shareholdings and debt instruments should not go beyond what is strictly 
necessary in the public interest. 
We will first describe the provisions on burden-sharing and bail-in in the Banking 
Communication of 2013 and the BRRD (section 2).6 In section 3, we discuss the broad 
economic policy requirements that must be met, notably within the eurozone, in order to 
construct sound financial institutions with aggregate financial stability. In this regard, we 
argue that there are circumstances in which confidence and liquidity shocks affecting large 
segments of the banking system in one or many a member state must be dealt with without 
activating the bail-in instrument, in order to avoid greater damages to financial stability. 
Section 4 assesses whether existing rules on state aid and resolution are sufficiently flexible 
to meet the aggregate policy requirements just described. Section 5 outlines how best to 
implement the existing legal framework in a manner that is consistent with protecting 
financial stability.  
2. Burden-sharing and bail-in in the current EU legal framework  
2.1 The 2013 Banking Communication 
The 2013 Banking Communication addresses the issue of burden-sharing in the section 
dedicated to recapitalisation and impaired assets measures (points 40 to 46). In the 
application of Article 107(3)(b), the European Commission has stated that, whenever there is 
a capital shortfall, it will require that any injection of public funds be preceded by all possible 
measures to minimise the cost of remedying that shortfall, including capital raising by the 
bank, burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated creditors, and measures aimed at 
avoiding the outflow of funds from the bank.  
As for burden-sharing, losses shall be first absorbed by equity, and then by holders of hybrid 
capital and subordinated debt instruments by means of conversion of their claims into equity 
or the write-down of the principal of their debt claims.7  
The Banking Communication acknowledges some limiting principles on the application of 
burden-sharing. The first one is the requirement that fundamental rights, such as property 
rights, are respected (point 19). The second limiting principle is an ‘exception rule’ whereby 
burden-sharing can be derogated when implementing such measures would endanger 
financial stability or lead to disproportionate results (point 45). Moreover, the Commission 
has committed to respecting the no creditor worse off principle, under which bailed-in 
subordinated creditors shall never receive a lesser compensation for their claims than the 
worth of their instrument if no state aid had been granted (point 46).  
2.2 Bail-in in the BRRD  
The BRRD, like the 2013 Communication, aims to prevent moral hazard by making the bail-
out of banks virtually impossible and announcing that any extraordinary public financial 
                                                   
6 In this paper we focus on the rules on the write-down and conversion of capital instruments 
contained in the BRRD, since the SRM Regulation reflects the same approach.  
7 Where the capital ratio of the bank remains above the EU regulatory minimum, burden-sharing may 
involve the conversion of subordinated debt into equity (point 43). In cases where the bank no longer 
meets the minimum capital requirements, burden-sharing entails that subordinated debt may either 
be converted or written down (point 44).  
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support will normally entail at least some bail-in of shareholders and creditors, in 
accordance with the order of their priority claims under normal insolvency proceedings. 
However, the BRRD differs from the Banking Communication as it contemplates the 
possibility to also involve senior unsecured debt instruments as well as uninsured bank 
deposits in the conversion or write-down of capital instruments and, in the place of insured 
deposits, the deposit insurance fund. 
The relevant provisions are contained in Articles 32, 34, 37, 56 and 59 of the Directive.  
The write-down and conversion of capital instruments may be exercised either 
independently of a resolution action or in combination with it when the conditions for 
resolution are met. In particular, Article 59 of the BRRD requires the write-down or 
conversion of capital instruments when one of the following circumstances is verified:  
 when the conditions of resolution are met, before any resolution action is taken;  
 when the appropriate authority determines that the write-down or conversion action 
is necessary to avoid the institution becoming no longer viable; or 
 more generally, even when those two conditions do not apply, prior to any measure 
entailing an ‘extraordinary public financial support’.  
As to the relation between Article 59 and state aid measures, extraordinary public support is 
defined as:  
State aid within the meaning of article 107(1) TFEU or any other public financial 
support at supranational level which, if provided for at national level, would 
constitute State aid, that is provided in order to preserve or restore the viability, 
liquidity or solvency of an institution or entity (…) or of a group of which such an 
institution or entity forms part.8 
The only exception to the rule whereby extraordinary financial support requires the write-
down or conversion of the relevant capital instruments, are precautionary recapitalisations 
fulfilling the conditions set forth in Article 32(4)(d)(iii),9 i.e. when the institution concerned is 
solvent,10 and the injection of funds or purchase of capital instruments takes place “at prices 
and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution”.  
                                                   
8 BRRD, Article 2, No. 28. 
9 Moreover, when the conditions for precautionary recapitalisation set forth in Article 32(4)(d)(iii) are 
met, the provision of extraordinary financial support does not automatically lead to qualify the 
institution as ‘failing or likely to fail’, which is a precondition for resolution. The same holds for the 
conditions contemplated in Article 32(4)(d)(i) and (ii), i.e. for State guarantees to back liquidity 
facilities provided by central banks according to central banks’ conditions, and State guarantees of 
newly issued liabilities.  
10 Neither of the circumstances referred to in points a, b or c of Article 32(4) nor the circumstances 
referred to in Article 59(3) should be present at the time the public support is granted. In particular,  
 the institution does not infringe and is not likely to infringe the authorisation requirements; 
 the assets of the institution are not and are not likely to be in the near future less than its 
liabilities; 
  the institution is not and is not likely to be in the near future unable to pay its debts or other 
liabilities; and 
 no determination has been made that the conditions for resolution are met or that the institution 
is no longer viable.  
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Article 32 specifies that such recapitalisations, which remain conditional on final approval 
under the Union State aid framework, shall: 
 be adopted to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state and 
preserve financial stability, 
 be of a precautionary and temporary nature, 
 be proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious disturbance of the 
economy and  
 not be used to offset the losses that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in 
the near future.  
Moreover, Article 32(4) also indicates that those support measures  
shall be limited to injections necessary to address the capital shortfall established in 
the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality review or equivalent 
exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, 
confirmed by the competent authority.11 
Recital 41 of the BRRD explains that the exception contemplated by Article 32(4)(d)(iii) 
concerns a precautionary measure whereby the member state takes an equity stake in an 
institution that complies with its capital requirements, for example where the institution is 
required to raise new capital “due to the outcome of a scenario-based stress test or of the 
equivalent exercise conducted by macro-prudential authorities” but it is unable to raise 
capital privately on the market. This provision may be read in light of the considerations by 
ECB President Mario Draghi in his letter to Commissioner Joaquín Almunia on the treatment 
of subordinated debt in precautionary recapitalisation:  
It is essential that Member States commit credible public backstops to ensure that 
resources are available in case private sources of capital are insufficient in the face of 
capital shortfalls. (…) While we hope cases of public recapitalizations will be 
exceptional, they may nonetheless be needed. This does not mean that taxpayers will 
ultimately foot the bill. Indeed there have been several examples in the recent past 
where viable banks have been recapitalised with public money as a means of 
enhancing confidence and stability, and where the funds involved were paid back in 
a timely manner with the State making a non-negligible return (e.g. Banco Popolare, 
Natixis, Société Générale or Goldman Sachs in the US. (…) 
Furthermore,  
(…) forced conversions of debt into equity may not be warranted in certain situations 
where a bank after an asset quality review has a level of capital that is above the 
regulatory minimum, but is below the hurdle rate in a stress test, or requires an 
additional capital buffer for any other justified reason according to the supervisor, 
and recapitalisation via capital planning is considered momentarily not possible or 
would take too long. In this situation the bank is not in resolution (i.e. is not assessed 
as ‘failing or likely to fail’ if it is not recapitalised), has a viable business model, but 
the supervisor still requires that it holds a higher capital cushion with the aim of 
enhancing confidence.12 
                                                   
11 In September 2014, pursuant to a specific provision of the BRRD, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) published some guidelines on the types of tests, reviews and exercises that may lead to support 
measures under Art. 32(4)(d)(iii). See EBA/GL/2014/09.  
12 Letter from Mario Draghi to Joaquín Almunia, 30 July 2013.  
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Summing up, the consequences of granting extraordinary public financial support pursuant 
to the BRRD are illustrated in Figure 2, with:  
Ei = State guarantee to back liquidity support by central banks, pursuant to Article 32(4)(d)(i) 
Eii= State guarantees of newly issued liabilities pursuant to Article 32(4)(d)(ii) 
Eiii= Precautionary recapitalisations pursuant to Article 32(4)(d)(iii) 
A= Residual category of extraordinary public financial support different from Ei, Eii and Eiii; 
and  
U as the symbol for union in set theory. 
Then, A U Ei U Eii U Eiii defines all instances of extraordinary public financial support. 
Figure 2. Extraordinary public financial support 
Article 59 BRRD 
If the measure falls within  
 
write down or conversion of capital instruments 
Source: Authors’ own configuration. 
It may be seen that the BRRD opens the way to precautionary recapitalisations as the only 
way of providing extraordinary public support to banks without falling into the conditions 
for write-down or conversion of capital instruments, let alone the start of resolution. On the 
other hand, any other form of state aid, including state guarantees on bank liabilities would 
entail the write-down or conversion of capital instruments issued by the bank.  
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Besides contemplating the possibility of precautionary recapitalisations not preceded by the 
write-down or conversion of subordinated debt, the BRRD, like the Banking 
Communication, also provides some principles and criteria for the application of bail-in and, 
more generally, the write-down and conversion of capital instruments, as follows. 
a. Priority of claims  
For loss absorption or recapitalisation in resolution procedures, the shareholders will bear 
the first losses and the creditors of the institution will bear losses after the shareholders in 
accordance with the order of priority claims under normal insolvency proceedings (bail-in), 
whereas covered deposits are fully protected (Article 34(1) (a, b, h)). The authorities shall 
follow the priority of claims under national insolvency proceedings also for write-down and 
conversion of capital instruments outside resolution proceedings (Article 60). 
b. ‘No creditor worse off’ principle 
The ‘no creditor worse off’ principle shall apply; the counterfactual are the losses that would 
have been occurred if the institution had been wound up under the normal insolvency 
procedures (Article 34(1)(g)).13 
c. Alternative financing sources in resolution procedures  
Pursuant to Article 37, a general principle of resolution procedures is that the resolution 
authority may seek funding from alternative financing sources through the use of 
government stabilisation tools provided in Articles 56 to 58 only in “the very extraordinary 
situation of a systemic crisis” and after a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation 
of bail-inable assets equal to an amount not less than 8% of total liabilities.  
Resolution funds, financed by the banks (Articles 99-107) may be used only to the extent 
necessary to ensure the effective application of the resolution tools, and cannot be used 
directly to absorb the losses or to recapitalise the institution. Moreover, the adoption of a 
resolution scheme entailing state aid or resort to resolution funds is made conditional on the 
approval by the Commission under state aid rules.  
d. Ad hoc exclusions of certain liabilities from bail-in  
Article 44(3) of the BRRD provides the possibility of totally or partially excluding, in 
exceptional circumstances, certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or 
conversion powers when certain conditions are met, including: that the exclusion is strictly 
necessary and proportionate to the effectiveness of the policy measure aimed to prevent 
financial instability; that the exclusion is necessary to avoid contagion effects; and that the 
application of bail-in to those liabilities would cause a destruction in value such that the 
losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities were excluded from 
bail-in. Specific provisions regulate the passing on of the losses to other creditors and the 
possible contribution of resolution financing arrangements, conditional on a prior 
contribution from shareholders and creditors for an amount not less than 8% of total 
liabilities; moreover, the contribution of resolution financing arrangements cannot exceed 5% 
of total liabilities.  
                                                   
13 Some concerns on the effectiveness of the safeguards for the application of the ‘no creditor worse 
off’ principle may be found in Giuseppe Boccuzzi (2016), “The New European Framework for Banking 
Crisis Management. Will it be enough?”, Open Review of Management, Banking and Finance, and the 
literature cited therein (footnote 15) (https://openreviewmbf.org/2016/03/12/the-new-european-
framework-for-banking-crisis-management-will-it-be-enough/). 
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In exceptional circumstances, the resolution authority may seek further financing from other 
financing sources after the 5% limit has been reached, provided that all unsecured non-
preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have been written off (Article 44(7)). 
e. Public back-stops  
Ancillary provisions to the bail-in tool include provisions on public back-stops (government 
financial stabilisation tools, consisting either of a public equity support tool or temporary 
public ownership), which can be used as a last resort, having assessed and experimented 
with the other resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining 
financial stability (Articles 56-58). 
The BRRD has now been transposed into the legislation of most member states. In the 
meantime, it has become clear that the current challenges for economic policy in the 
eurozone aimed to ensure the proper operation of the financial sector are more complex than 
what emerges from a model basically aimed to prevent moral hazard by the management of 
individual banks.  
3. What economic policies of general interest? 
The rules on burden-sharing and bail-in that have been described respond to the twin policy 
goals of maintaining a level playing field in the internal market while ensuring that 
henceforth the costs of bank failures are borne by banks’ shareholders and creditors rather 
than by taxpayers. By preventing moral hazard, these features are expected to promote a 
healthy and stable financial system.  
These rules aim to correct the incentives of bankers at the microeconomic level and therefore 
mainly focus on the predicaments of distressed banks on a case-by-case basis. However, 
these goals do not exhaust the list of worthy policy interventions deserving recognition 
under the TFEU. Indeed, there are grounds to argue that resort to burden-sharing by banks’ 
shareholders and creditors should be excluded in the presence of a confidence and liquidity 
shock hitting large segments of the banking system, to make room for the precautionary 
recapitalisations of solvent banks that are explicitly permitted by the BRRD.  
Two main analytical propositions are relevant in this context from an economic standpoint. 
The first one is almost trivial, but nonetheless highly relevant at all times and everywhere: 
banks are fragile institutions, dependent on their creditors’ confidence that their claims on 
the banks will always be honoured. The slightest doubt over the safety of these obligations 
may start a run on individual banks, rapidly spreading to the entire banking system. While 
deposit insurance has all but eliminated the occurrence of runs on insured deposits, other 
incarnations of the liquidity crises have materialised in the recent past, e.g. in the form of 
wholesale funding markets shutting up entirely for certain banks and banking systems, and 
banks’ shares and bonds indexes in financial markets falling to levels that raise the spectre of 
insolvency for viable institutions.  
The evaporation of bank liquidity is the critical element setting a system-wide confidence 
crisis apart from a situation of insolvency of individual banking institutions. The dividing 
line, however, is uncertain and possibly shifting with aggregate economic and financial 
conditions.14 The insolvency of a large bank or banking group may generate a confidence 
                                                   
14 In Lombard Street (1875), Walter Bagehot did not say this explicitly, but obviously had in mind 
liquidity crises affecting many or all banks, regardless of their solvency. For comparison, see J. 
10  MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CASSELLA 
 
crisis spreading to the entire banking system; and the evaporation of liquidity engendered by 
a confidence crisis may well push into insolvency banks that were initially solvent. 
The second proposition concerns specifically the eurozone, which is more exposed to 
confidence and liquidity shocks than a ‘normal’ banking system as a consequence of sharing 
the currency without a common fiscal back-up. At the root, the problem arises because, 
unlike nation states, the eurozone lacks a risk-sharing system for sovereign debts and, as a 
consequence, the doom loop between sovereign and banking crisis is always liable to re-
emerge.15 Banking union was supposed to resolve the problem, but it hasn’t due to the 
missing third leg of the system, that is the supranational deposit insurance system. The 
specific task of this crucial third leg precisely is that of removing the risk of large 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks hitting the entire banking system of a member state, with 
potential repercussions on sovereign debts and, in extreme cases, even sovereign solvency. 
National deposit insurance does not suffice as it insures depositors against the risk that their 
bank goes bust and can’t reimburse their deposits (up to the limit of €100,000), but it does not 
provide insurance against the risk of a confidence crisis hitting much of the banking system 
of a member state, leading to large outflows of liquidity towards banks in other member 
states and effectively drying up cross-border inter-bank funding, as we witnessed in 2011-12. 
Effects of this type may have been generated by the resolution decisions taken in some 
member states of the eurozone in 2014 and 2015, which suddenly alerted investors to the 
reality of the new regulatory regime – which by an ill-fated decision also applies to securities 
issued before the regime change, whose risk characteristics were thus modified without 
warning by regulators.  
The bouts of acute instability and overly low prices in EU bank securities markets in early 
2016 may indeed be due to this surprise, also in view of the continued uncertainty 
surrounding the future application of bail-in in different jurisdictions. As a case in point, 
market information indicates that the bail-in of Novo Banco senior unsecured bonds, at the 
end of 2014, in the context of the resolution of the Portuguese Banco Espirito Santo, has 
resulted in the shutting down of the market for that type of bonds for all but the strongest 
banks in EU financial markets. Similarly, especially depressed stock prices for Italian banks 
have emerged following the resolution of four local banks in November 2015.16 On the other 
                                                                                                                                                               
Bradford DeLong (2012), “This Time, It is Not Different – The Persistent Concerns of Financial 
Macroeconomics”, in Alan Blinder et al. (eds), Rethinking Finance, New York, NY: Russell Sage 
Foundation (http://delong.typepad.com/20120411-russell-sage-delong-paper.pdf). 
15 IMF (2016), “Global Financial Stability Report”, Washington, D.C., April and also Nicolas Veron 
(2015), “Europe’s Radical Banking Union”, Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series, Bruegel, Brussels. As 
reported by Veron, the Euro Summit declaration of June 2012 included a commitment to allow resort 
to the ESM, the new European financing facility, to recapitalise banks. According to key witnesses, 
leaders agreed that this would also extend to ‘legacy’ banking debts already covered by Ireland and 
Spain, and possibly at a later stage also to buy Italian and Spanish bonds, effectively turning the ESM 
into a risk-sharing mechanism. In the ensuing weeks, however, Germany and other eurozone member 
states backtracked on this commitment, placing the financial risk of direct recapitalisations back onto 
the member states.  
16 For a detailed assessment of how burden-sharing has been applied by the Commission in 2009-14, 
see Francois Charles Laprévote and Mélanie Paron, “The Commission’s Decisional Practice on State 
Aid to Banks: An Update”, European State Aid Law Quarterly 1/2015, pp. 88-116 (in particular Table 2, 
p. 102, and p. 111). In 2015-16, new cases involving burden-sharing by debt holders include Banif in 
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hand, burden-sharing has been applied in carefully circumscribed situations, such as the 
recent resolution of Hypo Alpe Adria, at least so far with no discernible destabilising effects 
on the rest of Austria’s financial system; but the Austrian government paid €1.23 billion to 
the German Länder of Bavaria to settle all legal claims by BayernLB, which had owned an 
important stake in Hypo Alpe Adria. 
The very design of subordinated financial instruments liable to be converted into equity may 
help avoid ‘cliff effects’ of bail-in, in the context of ongoing exercises by the EBA for 
determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for bail-in – the 
so-called MREL.17 
The risk of such idiosyncratic shocks remains high – as was shown by the acute instability 
besetting banking markets in early February 2016, which was due to two concomitant 
elements. The first is the continuing presence in the balance sheets of EU banks of large 
holdings of impaired assets (some €900 billion, of which about one-third was concentrated in 
Italy), which in the main are the legacy of falling economic activity. And the second is the 
low profitability of (large segments of) the EU banking system, owing not least to the impact 
of the ECB’s ultra-expansionary quantitative easing (QE) policies on banks’ interest-rate 
margins. Figure 3, drawn from IMF (2016), illustrates the strong empirical correlations 
between these two factors and banks’ stock valuations.  
A cross-border deposit insurance, as has now been proposed by the European Commission 
with its draft regulation European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), would play an 
important role in reducing this risk.18 But at the very bottom, the spectre of instability will 
not go away as long as the banking system is not substantially recapitalised. Notable efforts 
are being undertaken in several member states to restructure and recapitalise the banks, 
under the auspices of the supervisory authorities. Also due to the scarcity of public 
resources, private market arrangements are being pursued and represent by far the preferred 
solution. However, overly depressed valuations of banks’ stock in capital markets and the 
need for many banks to tap capital markets at the same time may make private sources of 
capital insufficient to meet the system’s needs.  
An injection of public funds to several institutions may then become the only alternative to 
continuing economic stagnation at best, or a banking crisis at worst. In this specific 
                                                                                                                                                               
Portugal, Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, Carife and Carichieti in Italy, Pyreus Bank and National Bank 
of Greece, and Heta (the ‘bad bank’ created in the resolution of Hypo Alpe Adria) in Austria. 
17 With the MREL, European authorities will ensure that banks have enough liabilities to absorb losses 
in case of failure, and, therefore, shareholders and creditors should shoulder much of the 
recapitalisation burden, instead of taxpayers. The MREL, which is assessed individually per 
institution (no common pillar 1 standard), will take into account the recapitalisation needs based on 
the preferred resolution strategy and it will have a quantitative floor based on total liabilities. Last but 
not least, the resolution authorities will have discretionary powers to establish a MREL that considers 
the individual idiosyncrasies of each institution. 
18 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 
COM(2015) 586 final. The system would, of course, have to be backed by a deposit insurance fund of 
appropriate size – which could well absorb the funds accumulated at the present time in national 
deposit insurance systems. And the governments of the member states would have to stand ready to 
back the supra-national insurance fund with their budgetary resources, in case of a banking crisis of 
major proportions – which by the way would be made less likely by the very existence of such a fiscal 
back-stop. The ESM may well be the instrument of choice to provide such a back-stop. 
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contingency, public support for the precautionary recapitalisation of solvent institutions 
should be recognised as a policy of general interest, in the meaning of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, 
and thus be permitted without triggering the burden-sharing instruments.    
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 Unless this aspect is clarified, the Union may be caught in a trap. If it doesn’t act, or allow its 
members to act, to foster the recapitalisation and restructuring of its banks, the economy will 
continue to stagnate and a confidence crisis will erupt sooner or later. If public authorities act 
decisively to reduce the risk of a banking crisis, by accelerating the clean-up of banks’ 
balance sheets and a stronger capital base, they are likely to provoke that financial crisis 
immediately by scaring bank creditors and investors with the threat that their claims on the 
banks will be destined for the waste-paper basket.  
4. Are the rules on the control of state aid and the BRRD sufficiently 
flexible? 
In view of the current challenges for economic policy, a crucial issue is whether the rules on 
state aid and the rules contained in the BRRD, including the rules on burden-sharing and 
bail-in, are sufficiently flexible to allow member states to adopt the policy measures that may 
be necessary in the public interest, as has been described in the previous section.  
4.1 Article 107(3)(b) TFEU 
As to the substantive criteria for state aid control, as noted by Advocate General Nils Wahl in 
his opinion in Kotnik and others,19 the only binding legal rule is Article 107(3)(b). In the area of 
state aid, the Commission is not empowered to lay down general and abstract binding rules 
governing, for instance, the conditions for application of Article 107(3)(b). Therefore, the 
Banking Communication is an act of soft law, whereby “for reasons of transparency and in 
order to ensure equal treatment and legal certainty”, the Commission announces how it 
intends to apply Article 107(3)(b) in certain situations. The Commission is bound by these 
acts of soft law, meaning that it may not depart from them unless giving a valid reason for 
doing so, provided that they are not contrary to the Treaties or other applicable legislation.  
On the other hand, the European Commission has the exclusive competence to assess the 
compatibility under Article 107 of individual aid measures or general aid schemes. In that 
assessment, “which involves the appreciation and weighting of different elements of an 
economic and social nature within a pan-European context”,20 the Commission enjoys a 
broad discretion; however, all Commission decisions in application of Article 107 are subject 
to review by the EU Courts, which are the ultimate interpreters of EU law. 
Although some case-law indicates that the possibility to consider state aid compatible 
pursuant to Article 107, paragraphs 2 and 3, is an exception to the prohibition rule and 
therefore must be interpreted narrowly,21 Article 107(3)(b) seems flexible enough to ensure 
that the control of state aid does not result in decisions incompatible with the general 
interest. After all, the whole process of modernisation of the control of State aid undertaken 
by the Commission since 2012 pursues the objective of promoting ‘good aid’, aimed at 
correcting market failures, while impeding ‘bad aid’ and minimising the distortions of 
competition that may result from public intervention. 
Thus, under the general principles of EU law, for aid measures or schemes to be considered 
compatible under Article 107(3)(b) it should be sufficient to demonstrate:  
                                                   
19 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, case C-526/14, Kotnik and others, 18 February 2016.  
20 Ibid.  
21 See point 56 of the opinion of AG Wahl and the case-law cited therein. 
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a. the existence of a disturbance in the economy of a member state, 
b. the serious nature of that disturbance, 
c. the capability of the disturbance to affect the whole of the economy of the member 
state concerned and not merely that of one of its regions or parts of its territory22 and  
d. the necessity of the aid measure or scheme and its proportionality to remedy the 
disturbance, in the general interest, as well as the absence of alternative and less-
distortive measures to attain an equivalent result.23 
Several points of the Banking Communication indicate the intention by the Commission to 
design a system for the application of Article 107(3)(b) capable of taking into account all the 
relevant public policy objectives. The Commission acknowledges that the overarching 
objective in the application of Article 107 in support of the financial sector is to ensure 
financial stability, while minimising distortions of competition between banks and across 
member states in the Single Market (points 2 and 7). When applying state aid rules to 
individual cases, the Commission takes account of the macroeconomic environment that 
affects both banks’ viability and the need for the real economy of a given member state to 
continue to have access to credit from healthy banks (point 9). Where large parts of a 
member state’s financial sector need to be restructured, the Commission will take a 
‘coordinated approach’ in its assessment of individual banks’ restructuring plans so as to 
provide for a system-wide response (point 10).  
At the same time, the Banking Communication places some constraints on the use of the 
different types of public support. Guarantee schemes will continue to be available in order to 
provide liquidity to banks without a capital shortfall as defined by the competent 
supervisory authority and may only be granted for new issues of senior debt.24 Moreover, 
the Communication states that before granting any kind of restructuring aid, whether a 
recapitalisation or impaired asset measure (point 19), the Commission will ‘normally’ (points 
41 and 43) and ‘in principle’ (points 43 and 44) require burden-sharing, in order to ensure 
that state aid, and therefore bail-out, does not go beyond what is strictly necessary, in line 
with the general principles of EU law (point 15).  
Finally, the Communication also acknowledges that burden-sharing cannot be required 
where it may infringe fundamental rights (point 19), endanger financial stability or lead to 
disproportionate results (point 45).  
Thus, on the whole, the approach of the Banking Communication to the application of 
Article 107(3)(b) seems capable of ensuring, when needed, the correction of market failures 
in the general interest in case of a serious turbulence in the economy. However, the adequacy 
of the approach also depends on the willingness of the Commission to apply the 
proportionality principle formally endorsed in points 19 and 45 of the Communication.  
Some concerns, in this respect, arise from the very specific and narrowly construed 
circumstances which the Communication refers to when explaining how the exception to 
burden-sharing contemplated by point 45 will be applied, as well as from public declarations 
whereby representatives of the Commission seem ‘unwilling’ to consider any public policy 
                                                   
22 Ibid. and the case-law cited therein. The opinion of AG Wahl adds that recourse to the legal basis of 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU seems even more justified when several member states are affected by a serious 
disturbance of their economy deriving from a global financial crisis.  
23 See point 53 of the opinion of AG Wahl.  
24 Banking Communication, point 23 and points 56-61. 
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justification different from the narrowly construed exceptions mentioned in the 
Communication.25 
In principle, as stressed by AG Wahl,26 member states remain free to notify to the 
Commission aid measures which they consider compatible with Article 107(3)(b) even 
without meeting the conditions set out in the Banking Communication and the Commission 
is under duty to “diligently examine the compatibility of such aid measures in the light of 
the Treaty provisions”.27 Importantly, in his opinion in Kotnik, AG Wahl states:  
What is key is that, from a legal point of view, a Member State might be able to show 
that, despite the lack of burden sharing (or the non-fulfilment of any other criterion 
laid down in the Banking Communication), aid to an ailing bank still meets the 
requirements of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Situations can indeed be imagined, in 
addition to those already provided in the Banking Communication itself, in which a 
government might show that the rescue and restructuring of a bank is, for example, 
less costly to the State and quicker and easier to manage, if no burden sharing 
measure vis-à-vis all or some of the investors referred to in the Banking 
Communication is adopted.28 
4.2 Interpreting the provisions of the BRRD 
While point 45 of the Banking Communication allows the Commission, for any kind of State 
aid, to avoid burden-sharing when it is not necessary and proportionate, the BRRD allows 
avoidance of write-down and conversion of capital instruments only for precautionary 
recapitalisations, as has been shown, subject to the conditions set forth in Article 
32(4)(d)(iii).29 Recapitalisations must be strictly necessary and proportionate and cannot be 
used to offset losses that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the future. 
However, the interpretation of these provisions must still respect fundamental rights, 
notably regarding the impact of the rules on bail-in on property rights. The Directive recalls 
the ‘no creditor worse off’ guiding principle. It is clear, however, that the application of the 
‘no creditor worse off’ principle is conjectural and complex and it is therefore not sufficient 
to exclude a priori that the discipline may affect property rights.  
The right to property, protected both by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
and by Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is not absolute and must be viewed 
in relation to its function in society. Consequently, the exercise of the right of property may 
certainly be restricted by national or EU rules, but only provided that those restrictions 
correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the Union and do not constitute, in 
relation to the aim pursued, an improper or disproportionate interference.  
                                                   
25 Point 45 of the Banking Communication mentions the circumstance “where the aid amount to be 
received is small in comparison to the bank’s risk-weighted assets and the capital shortfall has been 
reduced significantly” in particular through capital raising measures endorsed by the supervisory 
authorities.  
26 Point 40 of the opinion. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Opinion of AG Wahl, point 44. 
29 Moreover, guarantees shall not trigger the resolution procedure only if they are not part of a larger 
aid package and should never be used for equity claims (BRRD, recital 41).  
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In this perspective, for instance, if some provisions of the BRRD requiring bail-in were to 
endanger financial stability and therefore did not correspond to an objective of public 
interest, it might be argued that they would also be incompatible with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  
Summing up, in light of the discussion above, for the application of both Article 107(3)(b) 
and the BRRD, it would be possible to challenge before the Courts decisions by the 
Commission or resolution authorities if they failed to take sufficiently into account the 
general interest of promoting aggregate financial stability and other worthy goals of general 
economic policy. 
5. Treaty-compatible bank recapitalisations  
Once they recognise that the banking system in a specific country may face substantial 
requirements of fresh capital, and that private sources of capital may well be insufficient, the 
competent authorities should then be ready to open the way to well-designed precautionary 
recapitalisations, supported by appropriate public backstops.  
What comes to mind is the positive experience of the Paulson scheme in the US in 2008, 
when the largest US banks were recapitalised with public resources – in the form of 
expensive privileged shares to be paid back within a defined time period. This opened the 
way to deep restructuring of their balance sheets and thus establishing the conditions for 
their return to sound health. The banks were able to repay fully the public capital injections 
within the required time schedule, with a net gain for the Treasury as well as substantial 
creation of net value for society.30   
Taking into account both Article 107(3)(b) and the BRRD, a Treaty-compatible scheme 
allowing the member states to address the current predicaments of the EU banking system 
could encompass the following broad features:  
a. Each bank interested in participating in the capital-raising programme would be 
required to present a restructuring programme able to restore adequate profitability 
and obtain its approval by the supervisory authority; supervisory authorities may put 
pressure on banks showing weak capital and balance sheet structures to participate; 
in line with Article 32(4)(d)(iii) of the BRRD, the capital requirements for each bank 
should correspond to the shortfall established by the supervisory authorities, and the 
interventions shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature and shall be 
proportionate to eliminate the consequences of a serious disturbance. 
b. National authorities would elaborate a public support scheme for precautionary 
recapitalisations strictly necessary to fill a possible funding gap for a broad 
restructuring programme of its banks, and submit it to the European Commission for 
approval under EU state aid rules; the Commission will ascertain that the programme 
is not improperly used to offset legacy losses of the institutions; recognition by the 
Commission that the programme is Treaty-compatible would exclude burden-sharing 
under state aid rules; the public aid would be granted on terms that do not confer an 
advantage and shall be paid back by the banks in due course (consistent with Article 
32(4)(d)(iii) of the BRRD). 
                                                   
30 Pietro Veronesi and Luigi Zingales (2009), “Paulson’s Gift”, NBER Working Paper 15458, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA (www.nber.org/papers/w15458).  
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c. As a further option, the ESM facility for bank recapitalisations may be activated in 
this context to complement national resources, as already provided for by Article 15 
of the Treaty establishing the ESM, again with no prior bail-in of banks’ creditors.    
This approach would not entail any subsidy or market distortion in the evaluation of 
impaired assets, which each bank would have to handle on its own, based on current market 
conditions. These measures may in no instance be assimilated with measures entailing the 
bail-out of failing banks, which require burden-sharing in order to educate investors and 
avoid moral hazard. Treating the two situations in the same way, under a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach would be deeply misguided. 
In order to assuage uncertainty as to the viability of such a programme and thus underpin 
stronger market confidence, the Commission might consider updating the 2013 Banking 
Communication in order to take into account the evolution of the economic situation, and 
provide new and broader examples of the conditions under which – for a transitional phase – 
the Commission would be ready to consider a state aid measure or regime compatible under 
Article 107(3)(b) without burden-sharing. 
6. Conclusions  
In the early phase of banking union, the EU banking system is still plagued by widespread 
fragilities that are a major source of uncertainty, raising the spectre of a broad-based liquidity 
crisis in large segments of the banking sector. Under the current interpretation of burden-
sharing rules by competent authorities, this situation may be perceived by investors as 
foreshadowing the risk of write-down or conversion of banks’ debt instruments. 
The elimination of legal uncertainty as to what precisely is permitted to help the banks raise 
substantial capital with public resources is of paramount importance. Litigation before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, or waiting for the review of the BRRD provisions in 
2018, would entail delays and uncertainties that might prevent an effective response to the 
urgent policy requirements of the eurozone and the EU economy, as described in this paper. 
Rapid action is needed to reinvigorate the financial system ensuring that, overcoming the 
legacy of the crisis, banks return fully able to play their role as lenders to the real economy 
and therefore contribute to re-launching economic growth.  
As we have argued, there is ample room to interpret and apply Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and 
Articles 59 and 32 of the BRRD in a way that is consistent with the public interest, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the proportionality principle. In particular, once it is 
acknowledged that the banking industry has to confront head-on its substantial 
requirements for fresh capital, and that private sources of capital may be insufficient, then 
the competent authorities should be ready to open the way to well-designed precautionary 
recapitalisations, supported by public back-stops.  
Many member states in the eurozone and the European Union are still enmeshed in 
stagnating economic conditions, which are due in no small part to the inability to tackle 
decisively the structural weaknesses of banks and restore their ability to support the real 
economy with adequate lending. Resolving this issue cannot and should not be delayed by 
an unduly restrictive interpretation of EU rules, which already contain all the required 
margins of flexibility. 
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